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Love and Respect as Moral Attitudes and 
Practices of Recognition 
Respect and Love in Moral Discourse 
Among other things, morality calls on us to recognize others’ status as persons. In Kantian 
discourse this recognition takes the form of respect. 1 In certain strands of feminist 
discourse it takes the form of love or care. A great difference between these two forms of 
recognition is largely taken for granted by writers in both traditions, and notable scholars 
have suggested important differences between respect and love. In Metaphysical Principles 
of Virtue Kant contrasts them: respect holds people at a distance; love embraces them (Kant 
1979/1994: 113 (MM 449)). The distinction between justice and care perspectives on 
morality first articulated by Carol Gilligan seems to accept a similar conception of both 
attitudes: respect is detached, impartial, and individualistic; care is involved, responsive, 
and relational.  
Thus, it’s not difficult to see why Kant or anyone else would have the impression that these 
two attitudes seem to pull in opposite directions. But we might also find this puzzling. Both 
respect and love seem to be responses to personhood, to the fact that someone matters in a 
 
1 In this discussion, I use the term “respect” to refer to what Stephen Darwall (1977) labeled “recognition respect,” as 
opposed to his “appraisal respect,” which is more closely related to esteem. Darwall’s is a basically Kantian conception 
of recognition respect, but see Dillon (1992a, 1992b) for discussion of different conceptions. 
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moral way. “That love and respect are both vital moral forces certainly seems right,” Marcia 
Baron writes (1997: 29).  Elaborating, she claims that “the notion that respect bids us to 
hold back from others does not square with some of the specific duties of respect. Respect 
requires, for example, that we not be contemptuous, yet that would not fit under the 
heading of keeping one’s distance” (30). Robin Dillon argues that care is actually one of a 
great variety of types of respect because, at its heart, respect “is a particular mode of 
apprehending something,” “a kind of valuing” with “affective, conative, active, and cognitive 
dimensions”—and care has these same features (1992a: 108). David Velleman argues that 
love is a moral emotion similar to respect in that it is a response to personhood, conceived 
as the capacity to appreciate and value someone without comparison to others (1999). 
The idea that love and respect are allies is surely correct. I follow others in contending that 
they are both modes of recognizing personhood, and are thus distinctively moral concepts. 
I also maintain that the gap between them is not as wide as some have claimed; the 
difference, in slogan form, is that respect is an attitude that recognizes another as a person, 
whereas love is an attitude that recognizes another as the person they are.2 Respect 
responds to an individual as a source of reasons, an intrinsically valuable member of the 
moral community. Love responds to a fuller picture, one that includes the abstract 
individual, but also attends to relationships, projects, interests, and vulnerabilities. In short, 
 
2 This distinction is similar to the distinction Elizabeth Spelman makes between treating someone as a person in the 
“minimal” sense and treating someone as a person in the “maximal” sense (1978: 161). This is a distinction within her 
conception of persons as they conceive of themselves (as opposed to the conception of persons as bearers of rights, 
which is a more abstract notion). 
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respect recognizes personhood as such, and love recognizes selfhood or biographical 
identity. Both of these are important aspects of a person, but they are not the same thing.  
The first aim of this essay, then, is to argue that respect and love are modes of moral 
recognition that vary along a concrete-abstract axis—and thus that love deserves more 
attention in the discourse of philosophical ethics. Making my case will motivate a second 
aim, namely to show that respect and love must also be understood along a specific-
generalized axis: as a valuing attitude manifested in direct encounter (specific), and as a 
valuing practice that guides behavior in less intimate settings (generalized). 
Respect as Recognition 
To flesh out the idea of respect as recognition of personhood, let me begin with Baron’s 
point that respect requires that we not be contemptuous. Contempt, as an attitude that 
attempts to elevate one person over another, specifically ignores or dismisses another 
person as worthy of notice. Respect precludes contempt because it requires us to realize 
that others are in fact real human beings whose concerns are as legitimate as our own, and 
to behave accordingly. Part of the way it does this is by checking the ego; respect limits the 
pursuit of our own ends and backgrounds our own interests as we come to see another 
person as real.3 In this sense it is a leveling force, counting all persons as equals on the 
basic level of dignity and worth. Thus, respect does not inherently ask us to hold others at a 
 
3 Versions of this idea are present in Velleman (1999); Bagnoli’s (2003) discussion of Kant and Iris Murdoch; Dillon 
(1992a); Murdoch (1971/2014); Buss (1999); and Spelman (1978). Darwall (1977) does not use language like this, but the 
idea of taking appropriate account of certain facts—such as that someone is a person—amounts to weighing their 
personhood equally with your own, which means checking our own egos appropriately.  
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distance—in fact, it quite clearly stands against certain ways of holding others at a distance. 
We are to recognize all persons as persons, as ends in themselves. 
“Ends in themselves” is the Kantian phrase for what we are recognizing in a person, and I 
think it is apt; nevertheless, I do not wish to invoke the full Kantian conception of what a 
person is. The Kantian picture of personhood places a great deal of emphasis on 
individualism, reason, agency, and autonomy, so that what makes a person matter is the 
ability to exercise reason in pursuit of ends, the choices of which are (to be) constrained by 
reason. In this framework, personhood, or being an end in oneself, essentially consists in 
the capacity to reason, so that on this picture what we (are to) respect in a person boils 
down to rationality. This conception has—rightly, I think—been critiqued by feminist 
philosophers as unrealistic, given our relational, embodied, and emotional nature. Thus, 
without getting into much detail, I favor a conception of personhood that is more concrete 
and relational, including a role for emotions and attachments. What makes persons ends in 
themselves is that they are independent sources of reasons for us (Buss 1999: 536)—and 
we can recognize this through their ability to respond appropriately to others, whether 
through reasons, emotions, or relationships. Thus, many people who are not, or not fully, 
capable of Kantian rational agency are nonetheless real persons who matter morally 
because of their ability to respond to others and participate in social exchanges—even if 
they are not doing so in classically rational terms.4 Persons in this sense inhabit a concrete 
reality that is essentially theirs even as it is embedded in a social context.  
 
4 See, for example, Kittay 2010. 
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In construing personhood this way I take myself to be reframing the Kantian idea of 
persons as members of a moral community. They matter in themselves, and not merely in 
ways that derive from the mattering of others or because of their potential to become 
rational as they mature. Membership in a community involves a level of participation, and 
thus I retain the Kantian idea that personhood is a status that goes beyond merely having 
intrinsic value as some kind of object.  
Thus, respect is an attitude that recognizes persons as real, responsive ends in themselves, 
members of a moral community. How can we bring ourselves to recognize persons as such, 
given how very great, and sometimes threatening, our differences can be? Often it is not 
easy; our egos, which can pull us to see others instrumentally, are sometimes very difficult 
to check. One way to recognize another’s personhood is to learn a little about them—
enough so that from that bit, we come to see that they have projects and concerns that 
matter to them, and background, experiences, and social context, all providing them with 
reasons to which we may also respond. 
A story from National Public Radio will help me develop this point. Reporter David Greene 
interviewed math teacher Jake Scott, who teaches kids in part through his “alter ego,” 
rapper 2 Pi (2013). Scott works with students whose backgrounds could easily make them 
mistrust people in authority, and for whom school may not be as valued as it is among 
more privileged groups. Having come from such a background himself, Scott is well 




I mean, I think that we can preach to kids until they turn blue and we turn blue, but 
if there’s no connection, then there’s no response…. I mean, I constantly search for 
ways to connect with students—with the language, with conversations, music. Some 
students are more difficult than others, depending on what they have at home. The 
interesting thing is, once we have those conversations, that’s a connection. And they 
feel like they’ve given me a piece of them, and I feel like they’ve given me a piece of 
them, and I respect them more. And they respect me more. 
I see several striking things here. First, this report suggests that respect for persons as such 
is not necessarily a default state. This may appear contrary to the way most of us go 
through life; most of the time, we behave respectfully toward others, and we talk in terms 
of respecting other people. This behavior reflects a default assumption about others’ status, 
but what Scott’s remark shows is that the default is not based on a specific recognition of 
personhood so much as a generalization. We may behave respectfully, but it is not 
necessarily out of respect that we do so.5 I will return to this later. 
In this case, there is a further consideration as well: we often respect people as holders of 
certain roles, and this is not the same as respecting them as persons per se (see Darwall 
1977: 38 and Spelman 1978). Scott is a teacher and the person he is interacting with is a 
 
5 Baron’s (1997) discussion examines Kant’s treatment of the distinction between acting in accordance with vs. from 
duty. Furthermore, Buss (1999) ends with an insightful discussion of the fact that we often do not see people as worthy 
of respect. This is not a claim that we generally disrespect one another; it’s a claim that we’re mostly indifferent or on 
automatic pilot. She is not worried about this as long as we occasionally do have a “breakthrough” moment of truly 
seeing another as a person. Spelman (1978) hints at a similar issue when she distinguishes between treating persons as 
bearers of rights and treating them as they conceive of themselves in the minimal sense. 
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student. Rules govern how teachers and students are supposed to interact; they follow 
their scripts and they behave respectfully toward one another as people in those roles. But 
it takes a detail, a connection that pricks through the cover of the role, to actually touch off 
respect for one another as persons. 
A second striking thing is that connection starts the respect that Scott refers to. A certain 
distance between teacher and students is the given condition; it is part of the rules of 
teacher-student relationships. The small detail, such as that a student prefers to be called 
by a different name because his given name comes from his father and he doesn’t like his 
father, starts a connection. This connection is the seed for respect because it points out that 
the student has a story; he has concerns of his own. This serves as a reminder not to make 
presumptions about him that limit the teacher’s conception of him to his role as student. I 
cannot offer a phenomenology of respect here (see, for example, Buss 1999, or Bagnoli 
2003), but I will go so far as to claim that, however it works, the connection offers a flash of 
insight that someone else’s perspective is real. Perhaps a bit of empathy is involved. This is 
the moment of recognition of personhood, and it shifts us from generalized,6 default 
behavior or role-based respect to full-blown respect for personhood, an attitude that calls 
for certain kinds of responses.  
We should not forget, however, that the cases that drive the intuition that respect calls for 
backing off are also legitimate: assuming that the moral status of personhood involves 
 
6 I’m drawing here on Benhabib’s (1987) distinction between the “generalized” and “concrete” other, and her contention 




(among other things) particularity and the ability to respond to reasons,7 in many 
instances, the very recognition of a person as a person can require that we back off and 
allow space for them to manage their own affairs and make their own decisions (within 
their capabilities). Thus, respect seems to require some but not too much connection.  
This brings me to a third striking thing about Scott’s thought: that what the connection 
starts is respect rather than love. (This is probably not surprising outside of the context of 
examining the claim that respect is supposed to separate and love to bring together.) 
Among the things Scott recognizes when a student explains why he wants to go by one 
name rather than another is that the student has concerns and projects that give him 
reasons. This is vital information, but it is not much information. It is enough, however, for 
him and his student to move beyond the rules that govern their respective roles (student 
and teacher) and into respect for one another as persons. It’s not that they respect one 
another more, I contend, despite Scott’s wording. It’s that they respect one another 
differently. Scott doesn’t know everything about the student; he hasn’t taken the student’s 
concerns up as his own (as, for instance, a loving parent would). The student has become a 
well-defined outline in the shape of a person, a concrete person, and not “just” a student. 
The details have yet to be filled in, but the respect between them has evolved beyond 
respect for roles into respect for one another as persons—unqualifiedly, that is; outside of 
 
7 I use the phrase “respond to reasons” loosely here—for instance, emotions are, in a broad sense, responses to reasons 
(see Ben-Ze’ev 2000, ch. 6, Jaggar 1989). Thus, persons not fully capable of authoritative, Kantian-style exchanges of 
reasons can still be understood as responsive to reasons. 
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prescribed roles. This shifts the view of one another from primarily being a student or 
teacher (respectively), to being a person, among whose identities is student or teacher. 
Conceiving of respect as a mode of recognition rather than as a granting of space is a more 
fitting response to a relational conception of persons and the connection that gets the 
experience of respect going. In contrast, when persons are conceived of in the traditional, 
generalized way, they are essentially individual, purely rational minds, capable of 
autonomy, acting on the basis of reasons (Benhabib 1987: 163-4). Recognizing this largely 
would mean backing off and letting reason do its work. On this picture, backing off seems at 
least as important as the recognition itself, and the two may easily be conflated. But if we 
expand toward a more relational conception, we see that persons are much more complex 
and attached and concrete, and recognizing this does not necessarily call for backing off. It 
can, of course, and often does. But recognizing a person on this more robust conception 
calls first for acknowledging another’s concrete reality and the reasons it provides them, 
and then crafting an appropriate response to whatever reasons their reality may provide 
us. 
My point so far is that although we must act on generalizations most of the time, the real 
roots of this practice lie in the specificity of others and the normativity of individual 
recognition. So what we see in traditional literature on respect is the generalized form. As I 
will elaborate below, generalizations cause a belief in the recognition-worthiness of others, 
even when we don’t have intimate enough encounters to fully experience love or respect. 
What respect really is, though, is a response to concrete personhood. 
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Love as Recognition 
Respect does not go as far as love in recognizing persons, however. It’s a little like 
observing wildlife: you want to get close enough to recognize what you’re looking at, but 
not so close that you disturb the animal. With our fellow persons, we need to be close 
enough to recognize a person, but once we do that, we typically need further reason to get 
closer. 
Most of us do get close to some people. For many, the people we know best are those in our 
immediate families: parents, siblings, spouses, children, etc. With the exception of spouses, 
these relationships are not usually chosen; they don’t involve getting close so much as 
finding ourselves close. Two things come quickly to mind when we ask what distinguishes 
people with whom we have these close relationships from all the other folks we meet and 
interact with: how much we know about them, and how much we care about them. In other 
words, the depth of the relationship.  
Knowing and caring about others often—though certainly not always—go hand in hand; 
it’s difficult to say which comes first, and it’s probably different for different relationships. 
In the case of families, care likely comes first and motivates us to know one another. In 
friendships and role-based relationships (like teacher-student and doctor-patient), the 
reverse is likely typical. But once a relationship is started, knowing and caring frequently 
animate one another.  
For example, consider how good parents pay attention to their children as they grow up: 
it’s a process of both creation and discovery. They hope to shape their children’s worlds 
and values because they want life to be good for them (creation). But making life good also 
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requires that they learn what their children’s interests are and help them develop 
(discovery), because recognition as a separate person calls for this. Knowing what their 
interests are can also feed love, since good parents often come to share in children’s 
passion, dedication, excitement, and also mistakes and failures, as they begin to forge their 
lives for themselves (see, for instance, Helm 2010 and Frankfurt 2004). Similarly, the 
shared interests that often create friendships motivate care for the friend for their own 
sake, which motivates further knowledge, and so on. The cycle of knowledge and care 
signals that love is a mode of recognition, truly seeing a person in fine detail. Unlike 
respect, however, love recognizes not just that the other person is a person, but who and 
how they are—what makes them the unique person they are. It fills in and animates the 
personhood outline that respect recognizes. 
I will not give a full account of love here, particularly since there are many varieties of love, 
but I do want to highlight certain aspects that I think lie at the core of personal love.8 I 
understand love as an attitude characterized primarily by appreciation of and concern for a 
particular person9 for their own sake (not just as an instance of a type), and that endows 
 
8 My description of love is indebted to many sources. See Helm (2010); Frankfurt (2004) and (1999); Anderson (1995); 
Jaworska (2007); Protasi (2014). Some of these sources employ the word “care” for what I am calling “love;” on this, see 
my discussion below.  The notion I employ here, which encompasses the core volitional features I take these accounts to 
have in common, is also indebted to Velleman (2008 and 1999).  
9 I confine myself to love of people (and perhaps other living things—like pets—that can be said to have needs and in 
some way reciprocate) here, though in general I’m willing to follow Frankfurt in saying that we can also love objects, 




that particular person with personal importance that goes beyond her impersonal value.10 
Loving a person involves caring for her, recognizing her for who she is, with her specific 
qualities, interests, talents, needs, and so on. At its best, love involves receptivity (Slote 
2013) and concern for others for their own sake, as well as reciprocity in the sense that 
care and love are concerned that a relation, and not just a virtue, is preserved or enhanced 
(Held 2006: 50ff).11 It requires a genuine understanding of its object, truly seeing, without 
filtering through egoistic concerns (Murdoch 1971/2014). This appreciation typically 
motivates the lover to protect the beloved and to help her to grow as a person, in part 
because love has an emotional-volitional element that ties the lover’s welfare to the welfare 
of the beloved. It builds up another person by connecting with her, both physically and 
psychologically, taking interest in her interests for her sake. In addition, loving helps to 
constitute the lover’s identity because relationships are among the building blocks of a 
meaningful life.   
I depart here from the accounts of philosophers such as Velleman and Murdoch in that I do 
think that, ultimately, the lover’s identity is involved in love. Like them, I believe that love is 
 
Others, such as Helm, agree that objects and projects contribute to identity but prefer to use another term such as 
“valuing” for non-person objects.  
10 In this, and in some of what follows, I depart from Velleman’s (1999) conception of love. I agree with him that love is 
first and foremost an arresting appreciation of the beloved, seeing them for who they truly are. But like many feminists, I 
believe that love is not just appreciation of the beloved’s personhood; I believe that love is also appreciation of the 
empirical details and the particular needs and interests of the beloved, the things that make him who he is.  
11 This is not necessarily to say that love must be fully reciprocal and requited; only that love characteristically aims at or 
motivates a relationship with the beloved. See Protasi (2014) for a discussion of unrequited love. 
13 
 
first and foremost an arresting appreciation or recognition of the beloved, seeing and 
valuing them for who they truly are. The lover’s ego is checked by this recognition, and 
moves into the background of her concerns. But one important difference between love and 
respect, in my view, is that because of the intimacy of the valuing relationship, the lover’s 
welfare becomes entwined with the beloved’s, so that the self enters back into the picture 
because of the way the lover takes an interest in the beloved’s interests. Since this is for the 
beloved’s sake, however, it is a kind of expansion of the self, and I maintain that it avoids 
egoism. 
If what I have said so far is right, both respect and love are forms of recognition, and are 
therefore closely related. Respect recognizes outlines, the abstract form of a person; love 
recognizes particular qualities and fine details. Because their epistemologies are similar,12 
the level of recognition that goes with each attitude probably stands on a continuum.13 On 
one end is the recognition of personhood that goes with respect and, under some 
circumstances, moves in the direction of love as people begin to know more about one 
another. Family relationships—particularly parent-child relationships—often work the 
other way: they begin with love, and move toward respect if they are functioning as they 
should. But neither attitude precludes or erases—or, for that matter, guarantees—the 
other.  
 
12 I thank JWS for making this explicit. 
13 Dillon (1992a) makes a similar suggestion. 
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Love as Moral 
Thus, I’m contending that both respect and love should be understood as attitudes that 
recognize others in their concreteness as abstract persons and concrete selves, 
respectively. And when we view them as forms of recognition, their alliance becomes clear. 
It’s important that we be recognized by all others as persons (apart from any specific roles 
through which we relate to them). It’s important that we be recognized more fully by a 
handful of intimates as well, because persons in the abstract—particularly under the 
traditional, autonomy-based interpretation of personhood—are not all we are. We are also 
social and emotional creatures, “encumbered selves,” with needs and interdependencies 
that can seem to put limits on the exercise of our autonomy.14 Full-blown love is not an 
appropriate response to everyone by everyone, but it is nevertheless a response to a 
fundamental human need. 
I will elaborate these claims by beginning with the latter. In what sense is the need for 
love—the need to be known and cared for—fundamental? After all, a person could survive 
without it, if basic physical needs were met. Many have. But part of what love signals is that 
the beloved matters, and matters not just as any old human being, but as the particular 
human they are. (Think of Mr. Rogers: “I like you just the way you are.”) It is becoming 
 
14 Autonomy is complicated, and the superficial way in which ties to others look like they limit autonomy is misleading. 
The narrowest reading of autonomy as unencumbered freedom to do as we see fit is implausible even for classic liberal 
theory. For instance, valuing puts limits on what we’re willing to do by giving us reasons to do some things rather than 
others—but exactly because it is reason-giving, valuing can be seen as itself a kind of exercise of autonomy (see 
Frankfurt 2004, for instance). Feminists have been working to develop broader notions of autonomy that take into 
account our interdependencies (see Held 2006, p. 13-14 (especially fn. 13 and 14), and p. 48ff for a survey).  
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more and more clear that the emotional needs that are fed by close relationships are 
indispensable to full flourishing. Darcia Narvaez (2014, 2015) argues that children who 
grow up in environments with some particular manifestations of love—including 
responsiveness to child needs, positive touch, and positive social climate and support—
thrive in the sense of being physically and socially healthy, empathic, engaged with others 
and the world, and communally oriented (see also essays by Slote, Thompson, and 
McAdams in Snow 2015; Honneth 1996: 38). They have “deep social and cognitive 
intelligence,” well-developed right brains, and a rationality that “integrates well-trained 
emotions” (Narvaez 2015: 254). Children who lack these important elements display 
detachment, an individualistic, self-protective “safety” orientation, and lives in which fear 
and anger are prominent motivators. This seems like a less-than-flourishing sort of life, 
even if it is a life, and in this sense the need for love—and the individual recognition that is 
built into it—is fundamental (Cabezas 2016). 
Being a response to a fundamental human need puts love, like respect, squarely in the 
moral realm. But if love is not something that we can expect between any two people, it 
doesn’t fit well into our traditional categories of duty. We can talk of a moral duty to 
respect others, but talk of a duty to love raises difficulties (Cabezas 2016, Spelman 1978: 
159-161), given the emotional and volitional investments characteristic of love (though 
perhaps there is a duty to care in the minimal sense of meeting needs15). Any person 
 
15 Noddings (2002:49ff) claims that obligation simply happens to us when we encounter those with needs we can meet. 
This is, of course, controversial. Dillon (1992a) takes the notion of “care respect” to have an advantage over care in that 
it can be understood as a duty more readily than care itself can.  
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deserves to be loved, but it is not clear that it can be incumbent on any particular other 
person to provide that love—and besides, love is not a thing we can entirely command 
(though see Liao 2006 and Helm 2010); despite what I said above, even deliberately 
coming to know another person intimately may not result in love. Furthermore, love as I 
have described it is partial whereas morality is supposed to be impartial. These are indeed 
difficult challenges that require attention, though I think they can be met, and what I say 
below will be an offering in this direction. But even if they were insurmountable, these 
difficulties would not indicate that love is outside the moral realm. I can think of at least 
two reasons for this. 
First of all, love provides moral goods for both lover and beloved. In particular, it helps to 
constitute identities, as noted above. Our emotional and volitional intertwining with the 
people (and projects and things) we love helps us define for ourselves who we are; they are 
the threads out of which we weave our sense of ourselves. Thus, loving helps to constitute 
lovers’ identities; it helps us become the persons and selves we are (see Honneth 1996).  
It works the other way as well: being loved helps to constitute the beloved’s identity. As 
Hilde Lindemann points out, others—particularly those who love us—are telling stories 
about us, and those stories are part of the fabric of our identities (2014: ix). They can 
reaffirm or repudiate our conceptions of ourselves. Thus, my identity is constituted largely 
by me, but it is also constituted by my parents, siblings, spouse, children, friends, and to a 
lesser extent colleagues, teachers, students, and so on. Simultaneously, I am (to stronger or 
weaker degrees) contributing to all of those people’s identities as well. The stronger the 
relationship, the more influentially the others’ stories about us typically figure in our 
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identities. In this way, identity is a social practice and being loved helps us to be who we 
are. This is an important moral good. 
Robin Dillon makes related points. She argues that what she terms “basal self-respect”—
the “way of being toward and with oneself that is constituted by [an] implicit interpretive 
framework” that is “prereflective, unarticulated,” and “emotionally laden” (1997: 241)—is 
formed by the presence or lack of unconditional love, and is fundamentally not a private 
matter. The framework through which we form our understandings of ourselves is 
inevitably affected by the relationships and social structures in which we develop. One 
upshot of this that is especially interesting here is her suggestion that damaged basal self-
respect may be improved by two things. First, being loved unconditionally: “[a]s basal self-
respect first takes shape in the context of emotional relationships, so some damage may be 
ameliorated through loving relationships attuned to particularities and contextuality of 
self-respect predicaments” (249). Second, loving others: “inasmuch as basal frameworks 
are implicit in ways of being in the world, …[a] change from a self-obsessive mode to one 
that centrally involves attentive care for others—a valuing-others way of being—might 
make valuing oneself a real possibility” (249).  If, as Dillon asserts, lacking self-respect is 
debilitating, then loving and being loved are morally important components of flourishing. 
(Honneth makes similar points (1996).) 
Second, recent work on love and related work on the relationship between emotion, 
reason, and identity suggest that there is something quite fundamental about love as not 
only a motivating, but also a normative force in human life (see Held 2006, Helm 2010, 
Lindemann 2014 and Noddings 2002). For instance, the stories others tell about us—and 
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those we tell about ourselves—can be more or less appropriate (Lindemann 2014, Spelman 
1978). If I think of my daughter as serious because she rarely smiled as a baby, but begin to 
see a goofy side as she becomes a toddler, I cannot correctly hold on to that “serious” part 
of her identity, or at least, I need to readjust my understanding of its place in her 
personality. Similarly, if I conceive of myself as non-racist but regularly make 
microaggressive racist remarks (even unknowingly), then my story about myself is 
inaccurate; moreover, I am habitually getting others’ stories wrong by reinforcing 
damaging stereotypes. 
The moral requirements of love are revealed in the idea that we can do better and worse at 
recognizing people for who they are and holding them in that identity or letting go of it. 
Either action, as Lindemann argues, can be appropriate depending on the situation. And we 
do others a moral wrong if we get them wrong. The wrong is worse for those we love; as a 
mode of recognition, part of what love requires is that we respond to those we love as the 
people they are, in full detail. A teenager may accuse her mother of not understanding her, 
for instance, and—just or unjust—the anger behind this may be at bottom a demand that 
her mother recognize her as she actually is, a particular, detailed individual. This is not 
something we can demand of everyone, but it is something we may demand of those who 
love us. Thus, it makes good sense to talk about what love morally requires of us, 
reinforcing my claim that love is part of the moral realm. 
Valuing Attitudes and Practices 
The problem with casting both love and respect as attitudes directed toward particular 
others in relatively intimate encounters is that they seem to lose some of their moral 
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leverage, because we do not (and cannot) regularly have such encounters with most people 
we interact with.  
A distinction will be useful here to clarify the relationship between the subjective 
experiences of love and respect and their objective manifestations. There is recognition and 
there is recognition; recognition can be a specific subjective, emotional-volitional 
experience (loosely, an attitude) and it can be a generalized practice that arises from and is 
normatively regulated by that subjective state—the behaviors that the state calls for and 
characteristically motivates. I wish, therefore, to distinguish two axes along which we can 
interact with persons: general-particular and abstract-concrete.16 I have been arguing that 
as attitudes, both respect and love are on the particular end of the general-particular axis, 
and are distinguished from one another along the concrete-abstract axis (love is for a 
particular other as concrete individual; respect is for a particular other as abstract person). 
Now I wish to look at their analogues on the general end of the general-particular axis.  
The recognition I’ve been discussing so far has been the emotional, subjective kind, the 
kind that stems from the arresting of the ego in a direct and intimate encounter with 
another’s person- or selfhood. The respect version of this is what I take Jake Scott to have 
experienced with his student. The love version is familiar from our experiences of 
friendships, romantic partnerships, parent-child relationships, and so on. When it comes to 
practices, however, the reverse is true: the respect version is familiar from most people’s 
everyday experience, public discourse, as well as much philosophical discussion; the love 
 
16 I take myself to be refining Seyla Benhabib’s (1987) distinction between concrete and generalized others.  
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version has not been considered carefully until relatively recently. In this section I will 
draw out some implications of this. 
Generalized Respect: Justice 
Like love, respect (the attitude) is both a fundamental human need and response called for 
by identity as the specific beings we are. Respect responds to people’s identities as persons-
—it recognizes you in your capacity to participate in a moral community and respond to 
circumstances in ways that derive from aspects of your identity, perspective, needs, and 
relationships—as well as recognizing that you have a particular life that you are leading 
and are a source of reasons. Further, again as Lindemann points out, the interactions that 
manifest respect also contribute to that identity. Being treated as a person makes it easier 
for you to be a person. 
I have been emphasizing the subjective experience of respect, but treating someone as a 
person does not necessarily require a direct, arresting encounter as in the example above 
of Jake Scott and his student. If I am right about respect as recognition, the Jake Scott 
example demonstrates that the attitude itself is—like love—something we must experience 
in relatively intimate encounter with others; it is a response to the experience of others as 
particular individuals. Thus, we are unlikely to have the full-blown attitude toward 
strangers we encounter only briefly or superficially, like cashiers at the grocery store or 
even many of our students. But we are able to treat them respectfully on the basis of a 
generalization: because they are people too, we carry the presumption of their personhood, 
even though we do not encounter them in ways that emphasize their particularity (Buss 
1999: 519, 548).  
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The behavior of respect, then, can be performed even if we don’t fully have the attitude 
toward each specific person we meet, and it is important that we do so. After all, just as it is 
difficult to flourish without love, it is also difficult to flourish without receiving respect 
from others. This is why people go to great lengths to secure justice in the form of rights 
that institutionalize respect: laws about equality, personal safety, enfranchisement, 
nondiscrimination, and so on. And it’s why we call these things basic human rights. At the 
bottom of demands for such manifestations of justice is a demand for respect—for 
recognition. Thus, we can see justice as institutionalized or formalized respect, a complex 
of values and practices that stem from the behaviors called for by the subjective attitude of 
respect.  
Still, practices of justice cannot guarantee more than respectful behavior, since they cannot 
compel us to have the kinds of encounters that touch off the subjective experience of full 
respect for persons, if what I said above is right. Laws and moral rules cannot compel 
attitudes; they can only compel actions. The drive to recognize rights stems from the need 
for the recognition inherent in respect: the basic, abstract recognition of mattering (as a 
source of reasons, a member of the moral community). Probably because respect does not 
require great detail, it is well-suited to generalization and thus to ground the “justice 
perspective” in ethical theory. Its primary focus is on the universal and abstract qualities of 
persons, and thus, in its generalized form it can be applied more universally—to anyone, by 
anyone. And this places it at or near the core of morality, when this is conceived as 
universal and impartial, as it often is.  
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When the practice is distinguished from the attitude, however, it might seem that 
respectful behavior without the occurrent attitude is problematic; it is at best hollow, and 
at worst, a deception (which would undermine the whole point of the practice).17 The 
behavior itself may not be enough. Even if laws—and we can add less formal social norms 
and moral rules here—were applied fairly and uniformly, those carrying out their 
mandates may still fail to feel respect for those they do specifically encounter. Sometimes 
this shows in overt reluctance or grudging obedience to laws or social norms. Often it 
shows in much less obvious ways, such as implicit bias, microaggressions, and the other 
ways systemic oppression is realized. The fact that we don’t have a subjective experience of 
respect in many (most?) everyday encounters has serious consequences. 
But I think we can distinguish between a belief in someone’s respect-worthiness and an 
experience of respecting them. The former can be the result of a generalization that others 
we encounter are enough like us to merit respect, even if we are not directly experiencing 
that attitude at every moment. (For Sarah Buss, acting on the generalization most of the 
time is enough, as long as we occasionally have “breakthrough” experiences of respect for 
another (1999: 548).) The generalization can cause the sincere belief in the person's 
respect-worthiness, thus motivating respectful behavior. 
I concede that without the full-blown attitude of respect, someone’s practice of respectful 
behavior is liable to slip. A belief in respect-worthiness is not always as strong a motivator 
as direct attitudinal respect is. But this may be a strength of my view: it shows why 
practices of respect break down so easily. If respect is really the attitude I’ve been 
 
17 I thank JF for raising this objection. 
23 
 
describing, it’s hard, and rarer than we think, despite sincere beliefs in the importance of 
others. So in everyday practices of respect, it’s not that I’m deceiving you; I sincerely 
believe in your respect-worthiness. But if I don’t know you well, I don’t have the strong 
motivation of experiencing respect for you; I just have the weaker motivation of that 
generalized belief. So I can get complacent, forget to really pay attention, work from 
autopilot, and thus my intended respectful behavior can misfire. To accord with a true 
practice18 of respect, then, we must attend to the subjective aspects of respect and 
intentionally work to bring our attitudes and implicit biases into line with our professed 
(generalized) respect. A true practice of respect is much more difficult even than we 
already thought, because it will involve changing attitudes as well as behaviors.  
Generalized Love: Care 
As noted above, in the case of love, the attitude seems more salient to us than the practice. 
This is probably true in everyday life, and it is certainly true in philosophical discourse. But 
I think this can be helped if we distinguish between the subjective phenomenology and the 
objective actions that are characteristically motivated by that phenomenology. I suggest 
that care is a complex of value and practice normatively rooted in the values and 
motivations characteristic of love. If this is so, the practice of love is not as unfamiliar as it 
seems at first blush, though it remains true that care has not been attended to until 
relatively recently in the history of philosophy. 
Even in recent literature, care and love have not always been carefully distinguished. ‘Care’ 
seems to denote an attitude (“I care about you”), a value (caring about the environment or 
 
18 I’m drawing here on Held’s notion of a practice (2006: 36). 
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religious freedom), and a practice (the work of meeting needs) (Held 2006: ch. 2). I am 
suggesting that we can achieve some clarity by using ‘love’ as a name for the caring 
attitude, and ‘care’ as a name for the practice—a practice that, while grounded in the 
normativity of the attitude, can be performed on the basis of a generalization, just as in the 
case of respect. Thus, love is at the particular end of the general-particular axis, and caring 
practice (when not motivated directly by love of concrete others, e.g. in professional caring 
roles) is at the generalized end.  
In saying that love normatively grounds caring action, I do not mean to imply that love is 
the only ground for undertaking care work. Care work has been carried out by people in 
subordinate positions throughout history, because it has not been valued in dominant 
discourse concentrated largely on the public sphere.19 Many of the people performing care 
work are not motivated by love and some actively resist emotional attachment to those in 
their care. But caregiving can be performed on the basis of generalizing from the subjective 
attitude that characteristically motivates it, and surely this happens frequently in 
(under)paid care work. Thus it is clearly possible, and even common, to engage in the 
practice without full-blown love, which as I’ve argued is a response to the identity of a 
particular individual as an individual.  
The work of caring for others is characteristic of one who loves, though of course there are 
further actions that are also characteristic: hugging, comforting, listening, and so on. These 
are behaviors motivated and also called for by love. As noted above, it’s becoming clear that 
these actions are among people’s fundamental needs, so good caring-for will meet such 
 
19 I thank JK for reminding me of this. 
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physico-emotional needs as well.20 It seems likely that caregiving is at its best when there is 
some emotional attachment making the relationship stronger and more genuine, and thus 
more likely to produce the flourishing that a genuine caring practice aims at. The point is 
that the relationship between caring-for and loving suggests that caring-for can be viewed 
as a practice grounded in the normativity of love (in accordance with it), even when it is 
not undertaken out of love, in much the same way that practices of respect are grounded in 
the normativity of respect as an attitude even when they are not undertaken out of respect. 
Formal caring practices are more or less familiar: child care, teaching, health care, etc. are 
all common forms of caring practice. But I think care can be practiced in less formal non-
intimate settings as well; if we are attentive to the needs of others, we can do thoughtful 
things for strangers or acquaintances based on our general knowledge of what it takes to 
meet needs. “The kindness of strangers” is an example of this: buying the meal for a 
harassed-looking mother of multiples in a restaurant; stopping at the scene of an accident; 
cleaning a neighbor’s house when she can’t. Caring for others can happen even when we 
don’t love them, because we can generalize from our experience with those we do love. 
We cannot care for those we do not encounter directly, but we can at least perform actions 
that can make it more possible that everyone’s needs are met, that everyone is cared for, as 
I will discuss below.21 The overall point is that we can make a practice of caring behavior 
 
20 The deception objection I discussed above may apply here as well, but so does my response to it. 
21 Noddings notes that “caring-about may provide the link between caring and justice” (2002: 22), which strikes me as 




and use the value of caring, grounded in the normativity of love, as a guide to our 
interactions with others, and even social policy. This is the project of care ethics. 
Care Ethics: Love as Value and Practice 
Moral theories rooted in care and attentive to love are relative newcomers on the ethical 
scene, but I contend that they are not less important than theories with longer histories. 
Still, arguments for the legitimacy of love as fundamental to ethics have faced an uphill 
struggle. Love’s connection with emotion, which has long been opposed to reason, has 
made philosophers suspicious of its stability as a core moral attitude. It’s true that 
emotions are generally non-rational in the sense that they are not the direct result of 
reasoning processes. But this doesn’t automatically mean that they are irrational in the 
sense of making no sense or providing a false or misleading understanding of a situation 
(again, see Ben-Ze’ev 2000 and Jaggar 1989). Certainly, emotional sensitivity can misfire, 
but so can reasoning. And very often, emotions provide a helpful assessment of a situation 
that cannot be fully articulated in any other way. Some recent accounts of love view it in 
just this way, as a response that can be merited by others, and that is rationally assessable 
and influence-able even if it is not directly controlled by reason (Helm 2010; see also Liao 
2006).  
Love has also been viewed as morally untrustworthy on account of its inherent specificity 
and intimacy, as well as the way it binds us to others. Similar complaints have long been 
raised about practices rooted in love or care and related theories such as care ethics, 
because of these very characteristics. I think there are at least two claims being made when 
love and care are viewed as morally untrustworthy: first, that care ethics is no good for 
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public policy, and second, that care ethics ignores the requirement that morality be 
impartial. 
The first of these complaints is a well-known problem, and those working in care ethics 
have been developing the theory to apply it to public spheres that stretch beyond the 
parochial concerns that got it started. Virginia Held, Nel Noddings, Joan Tronto, and many 
others have made significant contributions in this direction. 
The second worry, that ethics rooted in love and care results in partiality, is more 
complicated. Care ethics can answer this worry by pointing to care as a practice guided by 
norms of love, and its resulting primary focus on meeting the needs of others—ultimately 
all others. Although a specific person cannot provide in-depth care for more than a handful 
of people, they can (via Humean mechanisms of relevant sentiments amplified by 
reflection) engage in caring practices toward all they meet, vote for policies that cultivate 
care and provide space for caring (both the attitude and the practice) to take place, and so 
on. Something like this may be the “care respect” highlighted by Robin Dillon (1992a). 
Noddings argues that although direct “caring-for” is where moral action begins, more 
abstract “caring-about” will play a crucial role in extending care to those we cannot care-for 
directly (Noddings 2002: 22-24). In an ideal world where we all receive the kind of care 
our brains evolved to expect, this would come more naturally than it does now. In the 
meantime, we will have to work hard to cultivate care. But doing so is within our reach, to 
the same extent as all other difficult moral development is. 
If love has an element of self-constitution and identity, however, although the above 
response will form part of the reply (insofar as love motivates care), challengers may not 
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be satisfied with this alone. If the project of ethics is significantly about getting us to step 
out of our own narrow sphere of concerns and take others into account because they 
matter in their own right, then we may well be wary of an attitude that seems to bind us to 
a small circle of intimates whose well-being is tied to our own. Such an attitude may seem 
to limit our practices inherently to that circle and cause us to ignore the plights of people 
who are not “our” people.  
There may be two “narrowness” worries here. First, we might worry that to the extent that 
love intertwines with identity, it does not avoid egoism; whatever we do is always at least a 
little bit about us. Something like this charge has been leveled against Aristotelian-style 
virtue ethics as well. I think Aristotelians have a persuasive answer to this worry, which 
parallels my own response: this way of viewing love overlooks the fact that genuine love 
(similarly to virtue) pulls us out of the very narrowest sphere, that of our individual selves. 
Because it involves caring about things outside of ourselves for their own sake,22 love is one 
antidote to egoism.23 Furthermore, as Held insists, to the extent that care ethics focuses on 
relation rather than individual virtue, it is not egoistic (2006: ch. 3). It may be partially 
about me, but only indirectly and non-egoistically: it is about me-in-relation. And if it is 
indirectly about me, this is simply an accurate reflection of human embeddedness, contrary 
to the individualism that prevails in dominant discourse. Furthermore, precisely because of 
its personal nature, love may be a more powerful antidote to egoism than respect is. 
 
22 That is, when it is not pathological, which it can be. But the fact that it can be suggests that love has a normative 
element, which supports the point that love is a moral attitude. 
23 See Hume’s arguments about self-love in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751/1983: 88-93) 
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The second narrowness worry is what we might call the “in-group” worry: that love may 
pull us out of egoism, but there is a persistent gap between “my people” and everybody 
else. Just getting out of egoism doesn’t guarantee I’ll be a moral person generally, especially 
to people I consider significantly different from me. Sure, it may make it more likely, 
because practice with concerns beyond myself can make me better attuned to the needs 
and moral claims of others (Velleman makes this point (1999: 373)), but this is surely 
contingent. I could conceive of myself as someone who “takes care of her own,” and nothing 
in this self-conception necessarily pulls me to take care of others with whom my 
connections are less strong.  
I’m not sure I have a convincing answer for those who find this problem compelling, but I 
do have a few things to say. First, the “in-group” objection is not an objection to using love 
as the normative basis of a theory. It seems to be the objection to care theories more 
broadly discussed above: that they cannot help us shape broad policy. Probably the worry 
here really boils down to the possibility that the Humean mechanisms of reflection on 
natural sentiments don’t necessarily work. But again, this is a failure of reflection and not a 
problem with love itself as a moral attitude that can form the basis for practices and 
theories.  
Second, the empirical work mentioned earlier suggests that if we can do better at caring for 
children when they are very young, they will grow up to be less fearful and self-protective 
than people in modern civilizations generally are now. With fear and distrust as less of a 
default, people will be more open to “Others” than we are now, and this could go some way 
toward weakening the sense of in-group/out-group; but even if not, it could aid Humean 
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reflection and help to generate the “caring-about” that can improve day-to-day 
relationships with strangers and members of other groups, as well as public policy. The 
individualistic conception of persons so common in Euro-American discourse could begin 
to give way to a relational conception. 
Third, if the worry here is about impartiality, centering moral discussion on love faces the 
problem squarely. We are not by nature impartial creatures. As Noddings writes, “An ethic 
of care does not justify standing with one’s own; it recognizes that most of us will do this, 
and it seeks to promote conditions under which this basic psychological orientation will 
not be called forth to the detriment of others” (2002: 49). 
My final response is that love, even—especially—on the intimate scale, is a moral attitude. 
If morality is fundamentally about recognizing how others matter and how we ought to 
behave as a result of that recognition, as I have assumed, then we ought to take love as 
seriously as a moral attitude as we take respect. Doing so has favorable implications for the 
status of care ethics among the “greats” of moral theory. There is still much to work out, but 
I maintain that understanding both love and respect as modes of recognition goes some 
way toward introducing a sense of broad continuity in moral theory.24 
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